AVS SUMMIT ONLINE

LAU03

The fundamentals of AWS security

Pierre Liddle

Principal Security Specialist Solutions Architect Amazon Web Services



▼ All services

Compute EC2 Lightsail 🔼 ECR **ECS** EKS

Elastic Beanstalk

Lambda

Batch

Serverless Application Repository

AWS Outposts EC2 Image Builder

Storage

S3 **EFS**

FSx

S3 Glacier

Storage Gateway

AWS Backup

Database

RDS

DynamoDB

ElastiCache

Neptune Amazon Redshift

Amazon QLDB

Amazon DocumentDB

Managed Cassandra Service

Migration & Transfer

AWS Migration Hub Application Discovery Service **Database Migration Service** Server Migration Service

Developer Tools

CodeStar CodeCommit CodeBuild CodeDeploy CodePipeline Cloud9 X-Ray

(A) Customer Enablement

AWS IQ 🔼 Support

Managed Services

Robotics

AWS RoboMaker

Blockchain

Amazon Managed Blockchain

Satellite

Ground Station

Quantum Technologies

Amazon Braket <a>Z

Management & Governance

AWS Organizations CloudWatch

AWS Auto Scaling

CloudFormation CloudTrail

Config OpsWorks

Service Catalog

Systems Manager

Machine Learning

Amazon SageMaker Amazon CodeGuru

Amazon Comprehend

Amazon Forecast

Amazon Fraud Detector

Amazon Kendra Amazon Lex

Amazon Machine Learning

Amazon Personalize

Amazon Polly

Amazon Rekognition

Amazon Textract

Amazon Transcribe

Amazon Translate

AWS DeepLens

AWS DeepRacer

Amazon Augmented Al

Analytics

Athena

EMR CloudSearch

Elasticsearch Service

Kinesis

QuickSight <a>C

Data Pipeline AWS Data Exchange

AWS Glue

AWS Lake Formation

MSK

Security, Identity, & Compliance

IAM

Resource Access Manager

Cognito

AWS Amplify Mobile Hub AWS AppSync

Mobile

Device Farm

₩ AR & VR

Amazon Sumerian

Application Integration

Step Functions

Amazon EventBridge

Amazon MQ

Simple Notification Service

Simple Queue Service

SWF

Customer Engagement

Amazon Connect

Pinpoint

Simple Email Service

Business Applications

Alexa for Business

Amazon Chime <a>C

WorkMail


WorkSpaces AppStream 2.0 WorkDocs

WorkLink

Internet of Things

IoT Core FreeRTOS

Learn a few patterns, secure everything in AWS



(Amazon VPC)

(AWS KMS)

Agenda



A builder-focused introduction to AWS' security controls

- Control your cloud infrastructure: AWS IAM
- Control your data: AWS KMS
- Control your network: Amazon VPC

You will leave this session with the foundation you need to secure an AWS environment

Identity and Access Management (IAM)



Identity and Access Management



What it is:

- 'I'—Authentication. Support for human and application caller identities
- 'AM'—Authorisation. Powerful, flexible permissions language for controlling access to cloud resources

Why it matters to you:

Every AWS service uses IAM to authenticate and authorise API calls

What builders need to know:

- How to make authenticated API calls to AWS from IAM identities
- Basic fluency in IAM policy language
- Where to find and how to understand service-specific authorisation control details

AWS API calls recognise two kinds of IAM identities

Long-term credentials

IAM User


Short-term credentials (sessions)






IAM Role


AWS identities for human callers: IAM users



AWS identities for human callers: Federated identities



AWS identities for non-human callers







Amazon SageMaker Notebook




AWS Glue Crawler




... and many others


Creating a role in the AWS Management Console



How authentication works in AWS



AWS-managed policies for common sets of permissions



Reading and writing IAM policy

Allow or deny?

What can (or can't) you do?

What can (or can't) you do it to?

In English: Allowed to take all Amazon DynamoDB actions

Reading and writing IAM policy

In English: Allowed to read and write individual items in DynamoDB

Reading and writing IAM policy

```
In English: Allowed to take
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
                                             specific DynamoDB actions
                                             on a specific table
   "Effect": "Allow",
   "Action": [
     "dynamodb:GetItem",
     "dynamodb:PutItem"
    "Resource": [
     "arn:aws:dynamodb:ap-southeast-2:111122223333:table/MyTableName"
```

This is an Amazon Resource Name (ARN). All AWS services use them, and they follow this format.

How to write a least-privilege IAM policy

aws

Service-by-service authorisation details











- DataSync
- AWS DeepLens
- AWS Device Farm
- ☐ AWS Direct Connect
- ☐ AWS Directory Service
- ☐ Amazon DynamoDB
- □ Amazon DynamoDB Accelerator (DAX)
- ☐ Amazon EC2
- ☐ Amazon EC2 Auto Scaling
- ☐ AWS Elastic Beanstalk

AWS Documentation » AWS Identity and Access Management » User Guide » Reference Information for AWS Identity and Access Management » IAM JSON Policy Reference » Actions, Resources, and Condition Keys for AWS Services

Actions, Resources, and Condition Keys for AWS Services

Each AWS service can define actions, resources, and condition context keys for use in IAM policies. This topic describes how the elements

provided for each service are documented.

Instructions for how to read the table for each service

Each topic consists of tables that provide the list of available actions, resources, and condition keys.

The Actions Table

How to Read the Tables

The **Actions** table lists all the actions that you can use in an IAM policy statement's Action element. Not all AF a service can be used as an action in an IAM policy. In addition, a service might define some actions that don't



lefined by an API





table arn:\${Partition}:dynamodb:\${Region}:\${Account}:table/\${TableName}

"arn:aws:dynamodb:ap-southeast-2:111122223333:table/MyTableName"


Resource ARN format


IAM in an AWS enterprise environment



Working across AWS account boundaries


```
{
   "Effect": "Allow",
   "Action": "s3:GetObject",
   "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::other-account-bucket/*"
}
```





Working across AWS account boundaries

```
{
   "Effect": "Allow",
   "Action": "s3:GetObject",
   "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::other-account-bucket/*"
}
```




Example: S3 Bucket Policies

AWS Organization

```
"Effect": "Deny",
   "Principal": "*",
   "Action": "s3:*",
   "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*",
   "Condition": {
       "StringNotEqualsIfExists": {
            "aws:PrincipalOrgId": "o-alb2c3"
       }
},
{
   "Effect": "Allow",
   // ... allowed access patterns ...
```








Example: S3 Bucket Policies

```
Account 444455556666
```

```
"Effect": "Deny",
   "Principal": "*",
   "Action": "s3:*",
   "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*",
   "Condition": {
      "IpAddress": {
         "aws:SourceIp": [ "3.44.55.66/32", ... ]
      }
},
   "Effect": "Allow",
   // ... allowed access patterns...
```



Expected network






Example: S3 Bucket Policies




Enable Block Public Access unless you are hosting fully public data in your bucket (this is rare).

Your bucket policy will still work for specific cross-account access.




Managing multi-account environments with AWS Organizations




Managing multi-account environments with AWS Organizations





Organisations provides guardrails for IAM



AWS Key Management Service



AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS)



What it is:

AWS-managed encryption/decryption service

Why it matters to you:

Many data-handling AWS services offer simple AWS KMS integrations. If you know how to use AWS KMS, you can protect your data at rest simply and with no management overhead.

What builders need to know:

- The basics of how to use an AWS KMS key
- Familiarity with the AWS KMS integrations offered by many AWS data-handling services
- How to use IAM to control access to keys

If you don't understand the next slide, it's OK



The mechanics of an AWS KMS key

For encrypting individual pieces of data (<=4KB):

- KMS.Encrypt("hello world") → AQICAHiwKPHZcwilv....
- KMS.Decrypt("AQICAHiwKPHZcwilv....") → "hello world"

For encrypting application data, use envelope encryption:

- KMS.GenerateDataKey → symmetric data key (plaintext and encrypted)
- Use plaintext data key to encrypt your data, then discard
- Store encrypted data key alongside your data
- To decrypt:
 - KMS.Decrypt(encryptedDataKey) → plaintextDataKey
 - Then decrypt the data with the plaintext symmetric key



EncryptedDataKey:

AQIDAHiwKPHZcwiIv+V4760rokzKMlVWo0 M902D5yVe3tqrBtwGBaaY6AwTrEcsjY0gT N8J8AAAAfjB8Bgk...

EncryptedPayload:

AQICAHiwKPHZcwiIv+V4760rokzKMlVWo0M902D5yVe3tqrBtwGEZdK9s3SxlUE11PSPSadGAAAAaTBnBgk...


Why you didn't need to understand that:

AWS services manage the AWS KMS mechanics for you




Encrypting the easy way with AWS Service

Integrations



Encrypting the easy way with AWS Service

Integrations



IAM permissions for AWS KMS keys


Question: What happens here?



IAM permissions for AWS KMS keys


```
S3.GetObject
                                                                Amazon S3
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "s3:GetObject",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*"
```

IAM permissions for AWS KMS keys



```
"Effect": "Allow",
   "Action": "s3:GetObject",
   "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*"
},
{
   "Effect": "Allow",
   "Action": "kms:Decrypt",
   "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-
2:111122223333:key/01234567-89ab-cdef-0123-456789abcdef"
}
```

The default KMS Key Policy



```
Principals in the account have
                              access if their policies say they do
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Id" : "key-default-1",
"Statement" : [ {
  "Sid": "Enable IAM User Permissions",
  "Effect" : "Allow",
  "Principal" : {
    "AWS" : "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:root"
  "Action" : "kms:*",
  "Resource" : "*"
```

Default KMS Key Policy created by the Command-Line Interface



AWS-Managed KMS Keys

```
Ad
```

```
"Sid": "Allow access through SNS to all
principals in the account that are authorised
to use SNS",
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Principal": { "AWS": "*" },
  "Action: [
    "kms:Decrypt",
    "kms:GenerateDataKey",
                                   AWS-Managed Key:
   ... a couple others
                                      aws/sns
  "Resource": "*",
  "Condition": {
    "StringEquals": {
      "kms:ViaService": "sns.us-east-
2.amazonaws.com",
      "kms:CallerAccount": "111122223333"
```






Amazon Virtual Private Cloud



Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC)



What it is:


"Your virtual data center in the cloud," i.e., the network for your cloud infrastructure


Why it matters to you:


When you deploy cloud infrastructure, your VPC is the network that provides connectivity to and from that infrastructure


What builders need to know:


- VPC core concepts: Subnets and security groups
- Routing basics in VPC
- Private connectivity capabilities














If you understand nothing else about VPC...




If you understand nothing else about VPC




If you understand nothing else about VPC . . .



If you understand nothing else about VPC . . .




If you understand only two things about VPC...




... understand routing

If you understand only two things about VPC...




... understand routing


AWS resources not in your VPC




VPC endpoints: Private connectivity to AWS services




VPC endpoints: Private connectivity to AWS services



VPC endpoints: Network as security perimeter



VPC endpoints: Authorisation using network path




VPC en

```
Region, e.g. ap-s
```

```
"Effect": "Deny",
"Principal": "*",
"Action": "s3:GetObject",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*",
"Condition": {
  "StringNotEqualsIfExists": {
    "aws:SourceVpce": "vpce-11112222",
    "aws:PrincipalOrgId": "o-a1b2c3"
```

ng network path





(A) VPC: 10.0.0.0/16





All access to this bucket must be:

- Directly from my network
- Requested by my Organisation's identities

Wrapping up








We learned:


- Identities that can make AWS calls
- How to read and write IAM policy





We learned:

- How AWS KMS integrates with AWS services
- How to authorise access to AWS KMS keys



We learned:

How to get least-privilege connectivity How to use your network as a security perimeter

Thank you!

Pierre Liddle

liddlep@amazon.com https://www.linkedin.com/in/pierreliddle/

